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Case Note 
A COMMON LAW VIEW OF CAUSATION, SCIENCE AND 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis 
[2010] HCA 5 
In March 2010, the Australian High Court in Amaca Ltd v 
Ellis [2010] HCA 5 (“Amaca”) moved assertively to clarify  
the approach of the Australian courts to causation in cases  
of lung disease involving multiple pathogens. The court 
demonstrated sensitivity to both the scientific and legal 
inquiries while reaffirming the obligation of plaintiffs to 
prove causation based on the balance of probabilities. In 
examining the plaintiff ’s statistical evidence, the court 
established important guideposts regarding the proper use 
and interpretation of epidemiology in the courtroom, 
highlighting both the relevance and limits of such proof 
regarding causation and the satisfaction of the plaintiff ’s 
evidentiary burden. While Amaca dealt with lung cancer, 
asbestos and cigarette smoking, the court’s careful approach 
to the statistical evidence and reaffirmation of the common 
law standard of “but for” causation are likely to resonate 
beyond the asbestos field to cases involving other complex 
diseases arising from a range of low-level occupational and 
environmental exposures. The High Court has established a 
practical and useful road map for the manner in which courts 
should integrate scientific proof into the inquiry while 
preserving the fundamental aspects and related application of 
the common law doctrine of causation. 
Basil C BITAS* 
Juris Doctor (JD) (Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC); 
Member of the Bars of New York State and Washington, DC; 
Practice Associate Professor, School of Law, 
Singapore Management University. 
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I. Introduction 
1 In Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis as Executor of the Estate of Cotton 
(deceased); South Australia v Ellis; Millenium Inorganic Chemicals Ltd v 
Ellis1 (“Amaca”), a decision rendered by the Australian High Court on 
3 March 2010, the justices moved assertively, and, indeed, unanimously 
to reaffirm the relevance and precise application of the common law 
“but for” standard for determining causation in cases of complex 
multifactorial pathogenesis. The case, which involved an individual’s 
development of lung cancer following the cumulative exposure to 
asbestos and cigarette smoke, is noteworthy to the extent that it 
(a) clarifies the standard of causation in such cases within Australia’s 
federal system; (b) underscores the importance of examining and 
interpreting the scientific evidence adduced; (c) highlights the 
challenges, potential and limits of the dialogue between the medical and 
legal spheres; and (d) suggests a more conservative or traditional 
approach to the issue of causation, where diffuse risks cannot be 
definitively quantified or parsed. The exposures brought about by 
industrial society may be many and varied, but the justices in Amaca 
have now reaffirmed that the complexity and overlapping nature of 
these exposures cannot be used indiscriminately to relax the evidentiary 
burden where causation is at issue. Amaca is likely to resonate beyond 
the asbestos field as courts in Australia and elsewhere deal with diffuse, 
but low-level risks arising from rapid growth and the development of 
new industries. 
II. Facts 
2 Paul Cotton was a regular cigarette smoker of between 15 to 20 
cigarettes per day for 26 years. He was also exposed to asbestos during 
two periods of employment, one with the Engineering Water Supply 
Department of the State of South Australia from 1975 to 1978, where he 
worked with asbestos-lined pipes manufactured by Amaca (formerly 
James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd), and later in his work with Millennium 
from 1990 until his death from lung cancer in 2002. 
3 Mr Cotton’s executrix secured a favourable judgment against his 
two employers and Amaca at the trial court level in the Supreme Court 
of Western Australia and later prevailed on appeal in a majority opinion 
issued by the West Australian Court of Appeal, with Martin CJ 
dissenting. 
                                                                       
1 [2010] HCA 5. 
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III. Issue 
4 Amaca and the other original defendants were granted special 
leave to appeal to the High Court on the issue of causation. Issues of 
breach of duty and foreseeability of injury were not in question. 
Accordingly, the question at issue can be framed as whether, in the 
presence of a breach of duty where injury was reasonably foreseeable, 
the balance of probabilities concerning causation justified a finding that 
Amaca’s specific breach and/or that of the other defendants led to the 
plaintiff ’s illness? 
5 How should the court interpret the causative role of the 
decedent’s exposure to respirable asbestos, an acknowledged risk factor 
for lung cancer, where the plaintiff ’s history also revealed a long and 
substantial history of cigarette smoking also closely associated with the 
pathology at issue? The case therefore essentially involved the analysis of 
a complex multifactorial, or synergistic, disease process within a legal 
setting. 
6 How does one assess and parse risk in such a situation and can 
liability be assessed and apportioned before causation itself is 
conclusively proved or otherwise plausibly established? To what extent 
can the court infer causation? It is the answer to these questions that 
highlights the difference between the nature of the scientific and the 
legal inquiries and that further yields the relatively “bright line” test of 
“but for” causation that separates the two. 
IV. Applying the standard and interpreting scientific evidence in 
the courtroom – Causation and material contribution 
7 The history of Amaca2 through the Australian court system 
highlights the collision, or evolving co-existence, of legal concepts with 
scientific, probabilistic analysis. While the case nominally dealt with the 
application of the “but for” or balance of probabilities standard to 
determine causation, it is clear that the disparate interpretation of the 
scientific evidence by the trial, appellate and high courts conditioned 
the interpretation and application of the relevant standard. The courts’ 
understanding of the pathology and related interpretation of the 
scientific evidence adduced in support of the plaintiff ’s claim resulted in 
the operational application of different tests at the trial and appellate 
levels as compared to that of the High Court. 
8 In cases of complex disease processes involving lung 
carcinogens, Australian courts in certain states had witnessed a qualified 
                                                                       
2 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
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relaxation of the standard of proof, relying, inter alia, on the House of 
Lords decision in Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw3 (“Bonnington 
Castings”). With regard to complex disease processes involving lung 
pathology, the court in that case asked whether the plaintiff ’s exposure 
to silica dust was a cause or otherwise made a material contribution to 
the plaintiff ’s development of pneumoconiosis, adding that any 
exposure above a de minimis level could be deemed to be material.4 In 
Bonnington Castings, the plaintiff ’s exposure to silica dust, a principal 
cause of pneumoconiosis, came from two sources, a pneumatic hammer 
and swing grinders, only one of which involved a breach of duty 
potentially triggering legal liability. Moreover, it was well established  
as a medical matter that the pathology develops over time from the 
cumulative exposure to silica dust. Accordingly, in a case where 
(a) silica’s role as a cause was well accepted and (b) the cumulative 
nature of the disease process was understood, the court found it 
logically and legally plausible to ascribe legal liability to the defendant 
whose breach of duty exposed the plaintiff to only one source of the 
contaminant. 
9 As a predicate to the analysis of Amaca,5 it is important to note 
the following. The plaintiff ’s exposure in Bonnington Castings6 dealt 
with two sources of exposure to the same contaminant. Silica’s role as a 
cause of the pathology in question was beyond medical question. 
Accordingly, there was no issue concerning the point at which to draw a 
causal inference from statistical data. The role of cumulative exposure 
was also well established though here there was perhaps a question as to 
what constituted a material contribution. Given the strong causal 
connection between silica and the development of pneumoconiosis, the 
court felt justified in adopting the principle that any exposure above a  
de minimis level could be deemed to be a material contribution. It is 
important to note, however, that material contribution was not used to 
establish causation per se, but rather to define the level at which legal 
responsibility would be triggered, the causative role of silica as a medical 
matter having already been established. Material contribution was 
therefore used to inform and clarify the effects and application of a 
finding of causation (ie, to establish the scope of legal responsibility), 
not to substitute for proof of same. 
                                                                       
3 [1956] 1 AC 613. 
4 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613 at 621, per Lord Keith. 
5 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
6 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
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V. Amaca distinguished and clarified 
10 Amaca7 constituted an opportunity for the court to clarify the 
relevant standard in cases of complex lung pathogenesis. It raised 
considerations that resonated with those of Bonnington Castings,8 
including a potentially deserving plaintiff, work place exposure, 
a complex disease process, and the interpretation of scientific evidence 
in the courtroom. 
11 It did not, however, constitute a situation involving exposure to 
a single lung pathogen known to “cause” the condition at issue. Nor was 
the exposure to the pathogens at issue solely the product of the work 
place. Rather, Amaca9 concerned the plaintiff ’s exposure to two different 
lung pathogens, cigarette smoke and asbestos, the former of which was 
voluntary and the latter “imposed” from the plaintiff ’s perspective due 
to the conditions of the work place. Moreover, the cumulative exposure 
to a single pathogen was not the sole issue, but rather the separate and 
combined exposure of the plaintiff to two different pathogens 
constituted the focus of the inquiry. 
12 The factual situation in Amaca10 was therefore decidedly more 
complex than the one at issue in Bonnington Castings11 as both a medical 
and legal matter. There were more permutations or causal scenarios to 
separate and analyse than in Bonnington Castings. Moreover, once the 
inquiry began in earnest, it was clear that epidemiology would play a 
significant role. The plaintiff brought at least six scientific experts to 
bear on the case, several of whom “had longstanding interest and 
experience in the study of asbestos-related diseases”.12 Although the 
plaintiff ’s experts developed probabilities for asbestos alone causing the 
decedent’s lung cancer, smoking alone causing it, and some combination 
of the two causing it, the trial court took a broad-brush approach to the 
epidemiological evidence, stating essentially that if each carcinogen 
posed a risk then it was virtually axiomatic that the two acting together 
would result in some type of synergistic or cumulative impact of the two 
substances, acting in concert. The trial judge therefore moved directly to 
the issue of causation, framing the plaintiff ’s burden in a manner 
echoing Bonnington Castings as:13 
If the evidence establishes that it is more probable than not that 
Mr Cotton’s lung cancer was caused by asbestos arising from one or 
                                                                       
7 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
8 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
9 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
10 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
11 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
12 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [17]. 
13 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270 at [641]. 
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both periods of occupational exposure to that mineral or if it supports 
the conclusion, on the probabilities, that his cancer was caused to a 
material extent by the combined effects of his periods of asbestos 
exposure with the effects of his chronic smoking [then the plaintiff 
would succeed]. 
13 As the High Court pointed out, no attempt was made to 
delineate among the defendants in terms of their respective legal 
responsibility, if any, arising from the plaintiff ’s exposure to asbestos 
and subsequent development of lung cancer. Moreover, the trial court’s 
approach to the epidemiology was summary, essentially amounting to 
the proposition that if both asbestos and cigarette-smoking were known 
lung carcinogens, then it was logical to infer that Mr Cotton’s condition 
was the result of a synergistic or cumulative interaction between the two 
in which asbestos had made a not insignificant, read “material”, 
contribution. The trial judge reaffirmed this view by stating in language 
highlighted by the High Court that:14 
[T]here was ‘really no answer to the evidence of Professors Musk, Wan, 
Dr Kendall, Professor de Klerk, Dr Leigh, and Professor Berry that a 
not insignificant contribution to the combined causative effect was 
due to this asbestos exposure’. The conclusion that both periods of 
occupational exposure to asbestos made a ‘not insignificant’ or 
‘material’ contribution to the onset of the development of Mr Cotton’s 
cancer (or both its onset or development) was said to be supported by 
‘the probabilities [being] that the toxic effect of the carcinogens of 
tobacco and asbestos had synergistic effect, and that their effects were 
also cumulative upon previous exposures’. 
14 As the disposition of the case by the High Court demonstrates, 
it does, indeed, appear that there was an answer to the plaintiff ’s experts 
or at least an alternative interpretation of their findings. Before turning 
to the High Court’s reasoning, however, it is necessary to review certain 
fundamentals of epidemiology and also the manner in which this 
evidence was subsequently treated (or not) by the Court of Appeal in 
upholding the trial court ruling. 
VI. Epidemiology and the legal standard of causation 
15 As has been seen, the trial judge in Amaca15 tended to view 
Mr Cotton’s environment and circumstances in the aggregate. 
Mr Cotton incurred various work place exposures, together with others 
arising from his personal habits, in the context of a complex disease 
process that certain experts had described as synergistic. In the trial 
judge’s view, it was therefore legally sufficient in ascribing liability to 
                                                                       
14 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270 at [689]. 
15 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270. 
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each of the defendants to describe how Mr Cotton’s cancer might 
generally have been caused rather than to establish the specific cause as 
a function of each defendant’s actions, and, indeed, of Mr Cotton’s own 
actions as a smoker. A clinical review of Mr Cotton’s medical case and 
risk profile was substituted for a legal analysis of specific considerations 
of duty, breach and causation. Moreover, this process was aided by the 
judge’s substitution of the “material contribution” test for a situation in 
which strict adherence to the “but for” standard of causation was more 
apposite. In an effort to avoid “rough” justice, the judge had come up with 
a “rough” estimate, construing the uncertainty against the defendants and, 
conversely, drawing positive inferences regarding causation for the 
plaintiff. 
16 It is to the issue of estimates that we now turn. When one enters 
the field of epidemiology, it is important to realise that we are dealing 
with just that – estimates, with some results being more robust or 
probative than others. Stated succinctly, epidemiology deals with the 
collection, collation and statistical processing of observational data 
concerning the disease incidence in human populations between 
exposed and unexposed groups in respect of a given factor or factors. In 
comparing the disease incidence between exposed and non-exposed 
groups, epidemiology yields a figure known as relative risk, which 
describes the probability of the risk in the exposed group as compared 
to the unexposed group.16 
17 Translating a relative risk into a legal context can, however, be a 
tricky matter as the parameters and nature of the inquiries differ. From 
a numerical standpoint, a relative risk of less than 1 does not describe a 
meaningful association as it suggests that there is no difference between 
the exposed and unexposed group in terms of disease incidence. Relative 
risks between 1 and 2 are deemed to be statistically significant, but 
evidence of only a weak association. Finally, statistical relative risks of 
more than 2 have assumed a certain status in the courtroom as they 
suggest that the risk of the exposed group in contracting the pathology 
at issue is twice as great as that of the unexposed group. Moreover, the 
notion of a 2 to 1 ratio seems to accord nicely, on the surface at least, 
with civil litigation standards of the “preponderance of the evidence” 
and its corollary of “more likely than not”.17 However, it should be noted 
                                                                       
16 Michael D Green, D Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, “Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology” in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (J Cecil gen ed) (Federal 
Judicial Center, 2nd Ed, 2000) at pp 363–369, 389, 395. 
17 Siharath v Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation 131 F Supp 2d 1347 (ND Ga, 2001). 
See also Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29 at [137]. For varying 
interpretations by the UK courts of the significance of a relative risk of 2 or more 
for establishing legal liability, see Novartis v Grimsby [2007] EWCA Civ 1261 and 
Sienkiewicz v Greif(UK) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1159; [2010] 2 WLR 951. The 
author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting these two cases. 
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that even a 2 to 1 ratio is at the lower bound of what constitutes a 
meaningful association from the scientific perspective.18 
18 With regard to the nature of the scientific, as compared to the 
legal, inquiry, it is important to note that the former seeks to establish 
associations, describing what could have caused a given pathology. 
Moreover, from a scientific point of view, an association is not 
tantamount to causation per se. Through observational data, scientists 
begin to establish probabilities that are related to certain risk factors. 
Epidemiology does not shed light on the mechanism of the disease 
etiology or process nor does it establish causation per se. However, as a 
statistical association between a given risk factor and a given disease 
becomes greater and more robust in terms of the magnitude of the 
relative risk, there will be a point at which a causal inference can be 
drawn. Scientists differ over this threshold, a point which fuelled the 
controversy over lung cancer and tobacco smoking for many years, but 
in any event, the epidemiological threshold for a finding of “causation” 
is generally above the relative risk (“RR”) of 2, that has become a type of 
gold standard for the courts.19 
19 When more than one risk factor is in operation in a so-called 
multifactorial disease, such as lung cancer, the situation becomes 
complex and the differences between the nature of the scientific and 
legal inquires even starker. In a multifactorial setting, the scientific 
inquiry will seek to evaluate the nature of the risk from each factor 
independently and/or to assess whether there is a significant interaction 
or synergy between the two in the onset of the pathology. The inquiry is 
geared toward gaining a better understanding of the disease and the role 
of various risk factors within a constellation of environmental and 
lifestyle factors. The goal is therefore to gain increased understanding of 
the disease over time rather than to arrive at a final conclusion 
concerning cause or causation within a specific context. The legal 
inquiry, of course, seeks a definitive answer to a specific question within 
a fixed time frame, using scientific data that have evolved in a distinctly 
different intellectual context and field of inquiry. It is this interaction, a 
conflict of contexts or paradigms, that renders the competent handling 
of epidemiological evidence in the courtroom so difficult. 
                                                                       
18 Wayne Roth-Nelson & Kathey Verdeal, “Risk Evidence in Toxic Torts” (1995-6) 
2 Envtl Law 405 at 425–426. See also Basil C Bitas, “Probability in the Courtroom” 
in Handbook of Probability: Theory and Applications (Tamás Rudas gen ed) (Sage 
Publications, 1st Ed, 2008) at p 429. 
19 Basil C Bitas, “Probability in the Courtroom” in Handbook of Probability: Theory 
and Applications (Tamás Rudas gen ed) (Sage Publications, 1st Ed, 2008) at p 429. 
See also Wayne Roth-Nelson & Kathey Verdeal, “Risk Evidence in Toxic Torts” 
(1995–6) 2 Envtl Law 405 at 425–426. 
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VII. Courts and scientific evidence 
20 In Bonnington Castings,20 a statistical approach was not 
necessary as it was well established from both a medical and “common 
sense” perspective that silica dust could both cause and aggravate the 
condition known as pneumoconiosis. Causation had been established as 
a medical and biological fact. However, in Amaca, epidemiology and 
statistics were required at the trial court level21 to support the speculative 
conclusions or causal inferences concerning the relationship between 
two different carcinogens alleged to function both independently and 
cumulatively in the onset of the disease. Epidemiology was necessary to 
fill a gap in the corpus of direct biological proof. As has been seen, the 
trial court took a broad-brush approach to the epidemiology, taking the 
expert opinion regarding the possible cumulative effect of the two risk 
factors at face value and applying a watered down standard of “material 
contribution” to find each of the defendants liable. 
A. Court of Appeal – Accepting the trial court findings without 
reference to the epidemiology 
21 The Court of Appeal’s approach to the interpretation of 
scientific evidence in the context of legal causation harkened back to 
that of Bonnington Castings,22 albeit in a factual context that was far 
more complex. The issue with which the House of Lords in Bonnington 
Castings and the trial and appellate courts in Amaca23 were essentially 
grappling was the notion of causation regarding a so-called indivisible 
disease potentially brought about by at least two separate sources of 
exposure to a potentially causative agent. Again, Amaca introduced an 
additional element of complexity as it dealt with multiple sources of 
exposure and two different agents. Where the state of medical 
knowledge was such that an exposure at issue could be considered to be 
a general cause of the disease, even if not established to be the sole cause 
in the particular case, Australian courts had been inclined to let 
plaintiffs jump the “evidential gap”24 by making a causal inference at 
least in cases where exposure to the same causative agent, albeit from 
two different sources, was involved. The Amaca trial court extended this 
reasoning to a situation where exposure to two different causative agents 
was at issue. Rather than disregard the epidemiology, the court took the 
view that the statistical evidence, coupled with expert opinion, having 
established the synergistic nature of the disease where two causes act 
                                                                       
20 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
21 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270. 
22 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
23 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270; The State of South Australia v 
Ellis [2008] WASCA 200. 
24 Amaca Pty Ltd v Hannel [2007] WASCA 158 at [420]. 
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interdependently and cumulatively to produce the pathology, it was 
appropriate to consider causation as established and to move to the 
lesser standard of “material contribution”. 
22 The majority opinion in the Court of Appeal took a somewhat 
more radical approach to the epidemiological evidence. Accepting the 
trial judge’s finding that “the medical evidence reflected in the 
acknowledged synergistic effect of tobacco smoke and asbestos [showed] 
that tobacco smoke and asbestos fibers operated interdependently and 
thus cumulatively to cause Mr Cotton’s lung cancer”, the majority 
concluded that it was no longer necessary or appropriate to investigate 
the role of the asbestos and cigarette smoke as independent causative 
agents even if the plaintiff had adduced proof to this effect.25 
Once it is accepted that smoking and asbestos are not independent, 
but rather cumulative causes of lung cancer, the epidemiological 
evidence has no direct application to the question of causation at law 
because it is based on a false assumption. Once it is determined that 
tobacco smoking and all asbestos exposures operated cumulatively, the 
only remaining issue is whether each asbestos exposure made a 
material contribution. 
23 The Court of Appeal was essentially stating that direct proof in 
the form of expert opinion, particularly from that of Dr Leigh, the only 
specialist physician and epidemiologist among the plaintiff ’s cadre of 
expert witnesses, rendered the epidemiological analysis moot or at least 
irrelevant. In a manner similar to the trial court, but in more 
unequivocal terms, the Court of Appeal was asserting that a finding of 
synergy trumped any specific numbers. In contrast, the trial court had 
seemed to suggest that the numbers, together with expert opinion, 
suggested a certain synergy. Both courts arrived at the lower standard of 
“material contribution”, but with different levels of deference to the 
specific statistical findings. The trial court relied on a general inference 
of causation based on its interpretation of the aggregate findings, 
thereby giving rise to application of the lower standard. The Court of 
Appeal relied on what it perceived to be conclusive expert assertions 
concerning the nature of the disease, thereby giving rise to application 
of the lower standard and the consequent disregard of the specific 
statistical findings. Indeed, the Court of Appeal appeared to be treating 
as “medical” fact a situation that was actually rife with uncertainty.26 
Their approach reflected a wholesale and inapposite use of Bonnington 
Castings,27 treating the science as established without regard to the 
statistical findings in a situation that was susceptible to many different 
                                                                       
25 The State of South Australia v Ellis [2008] WASCA 200 at [336]. 
26 The State of South Australia v Ellis [2008] WASCA 200 at [319] and [336]. 
27 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
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interpretations due to the complexity, nature and number of exposures 
at issue. 
B. The High Court – A return to the “but for” standard 
24 The High Court sought to parse the approaches at the trial and 
appeals court levels by distinguishing between direct biological proof as 
reflected in accepted medical knowledge or expert opinion and general 
causal inferences drawn from aggregate, statistical proof and by further 
highlighting the role of specific causation, that is the link to the plaintiff, 
within that mix. Behind the High Court’s analysis was a desire to 
delineate not only among the responsibility of the respective defendants 
but also a desire to limit application of the material contribution 
standard to cases involving multiple exposures to a single, known 
pathogen emanating from different sources. Again, Amaca dealt with 
multiple exposures to asbestos from two different workplace situations, 
together with a separate non-workplace exposure to cigarette smoke. In 
looking at the evidence adduced at trial, the High Court first asked 
whether causation had been established by direct proof as reflected in 
specific biological evidence and expert opinion, concluding that none of 
the experts, including Dr Leigh, the only specialist physician and 
epidemiologist in the group, had adopted the position that smoking and 
asbestos must work together to cause cancer.28 
25 With the causal connection not having been satisfied by direct 
proof or expert testimony, the High Court then explored the strength of 
the causal inference that could be drawn from the epidemiology. This 
type of thoroughgoing exploration of the issue of causation marked the 
High Court’s moving back to the strict application of the “but for” 
standard. 
26 Looking at the epidemiology, the court noted that the relative 
risks established by the experts for contracting lung cancer from 
smoking were 7.7, 20, 15 and 8 respectively. It is worth noting that these 
thresholds were all well above the relative risk of 2, that is twice as more 
likely, often seen by courts as an important threshold in establishing 
“but-for” causation. The relative risks established by the experts for the 
risk of contracting lung cancer from exposure to asbestos were 1.3, 1.1 
to 1.2, 1.1 and 1.16, placing these figures in the statistical nether land 
between 1 and 2 where the association is weak at best. Using these 
relative risk figures, the experts went on to assign probabilities to 
Mr Cotton’s condition being caused by smoking alone, by asbestos alone 
or by the interaction of the two. With regard to the former, no estimate 
was lower than 67%. For asbestos, no estimate was higher than 23%. 
                                                                       
28 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [53]. 
318 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2011) 23 SAcLJ 
 
With regard to the combined exposure to both, the highest figure was 
20%. The expert consensus was that the risk of contracting lung cancer 
from cigarette smoking was many times higher than the one arising 
from asbestos. Moreover, on the issue of the proposed synergy, the 
highest figure was many times lower than the similar probabilities 
ascribed to smoking alone.29 
27 The High Court placed emphasis on the interpretation of 
Dr Leigh’s expert opinion wherein he stated that “while the precise 
mechanism of interaction between asbestos and tobacco smoke in 
causing lung cancer is not known, it is not possible in my view to 
separate their effects in the individual case when both have acted and it 
is thus more probable than not that in this situation, the lung cancer was 
the singular result of the two factors acting together. It is, however, true 
that exposure to either factor alone is capable of causing lung cancer.”30 
28 Given the probabilities in question, including the much lower 
values ascribed to asbestos, and, indeed, Dr Leigh’s admission that the 
mechanism of interaction was not known and that either factor alone 
could cause lung cancer, the High Court found that the threshold for 
drawing a causal inference was not met. Moreover, in making this point, 
the court also touched on the issue of general versus specific causation, 
noting that the plaintiff had confined her argument to a discussion of 
asbestos and tobacco smoke whereas the universe of potential risk 
factors could be much greater. As the High Court put it: “But if 
conclusions are to be drawn from population studies, all of the results 
obtained for all possible causes of the cancer must be considered. To 
consider whether one of two circumstances is more dangerous than 
another must not be permitted to obscure examination of the relative 
danger of all causes.”31 The court therefore took issue with the scope of 
the inquiry and its potential relationship to Mr Cotton’s illness. 
29 On the issue of the use of epidemiological studies and specific 
causation, the court added that: “To draw an inference about causation 
from what was established by the epidemiological studies, it would be 
necessary to decide whether the particular case under consideration 
should be treated as conforming to the pattern described by the 
epidemiological studies … Absent evidence which suggests that the 
individual may stand apart from the ordinary, there may be sufficient 
reason to assume conformity, but whether or not this is so, it is 
important to recognize that the first step must be taken, if an inference 
is to be drawn from epidemiological studies …”32 Then to close the 
                                                                       
29 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [29]–[30]. 
30 Ellis v The State of South Australia [2006] WASC 270 at [354]. 
31 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [56]. 
32 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [62]. 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ Causation, Science and Statistical Evidence 319 
 
circle, the High Court added that even if the general studies could be 
linked to Mr Cotton’s circumstances, the probabilities reflected in the 
epidemiology were insufficient to support a finding of causation. The 
“material contribution” standard for synergistic disease did not enter 
into the analysis because there was simply no foundational evidence 
regarding causation. 
30 The High Court moved assertively to clarify the approach to 
causation, the scope and application of the “but-for” versus “material 
contribution” standard, and the role of direct biological proof, expert 
opinion and statistical epidemiological evidence in satisfying the 
plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden. The effect of this exercise was to 
reinvigorate the application of the “but for” test even in complex cases 
of medical causation, thereby arresting any further drift toward the 
lower standard of “material contribution”. Amaca offered the High 
Court a chance to reaffirm and extend the application of Bonnington 
Castings33 and the “material contribution” standard to cases involving a 
plaintiff ’s multiple exposures to different pathogens. This the court 
most resolutely refused to do. Distinguishing this case from, and 
criticising the plaintiff ’s reliance on, Bonnington Castings, the court 
stated:34 
The issue in Bonnington Castings was whether one source of an 
injurious substance contributed to a gradual accumulation of dust 
that resulted in disease. The issue here is whether one substance that 
can cause injury did cause injury. Or, to adopt and adapt what Starke J 
said in Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Frost,
35
 was Mr Cotton’s cancer 
‘intimately connected with and contributed to’ by exposure to 
asbestos? Questions of material contribution arise only if a connection 
between Mr Cotton’s inhaling asbestos and his developing cancer was 
established. 
31 The High Court’s last sentence is instructive. The material 
contribution test is not a substitute for proof of causation, but is a 
means of establishing the scope of legal liability where medical 
causation has been established through some plausible means, whether 
based on recognised scientific fact, direct biological proof, conclusive 
expert testimony or compelling epidemiological data. However, in 
Amaca, with multiple pathogens and sources, inconclusive scientific 
testimony, an incomplete understanding of the so-called synergistic 
mechanism, and statistical data far below the threshold at which a causal 
                                                                       
33 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
34 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [68]. 
35 (1940) 64 CLR 538 at 567; [1940] HCA 45. 
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inference can sometimes be drawn, there was simply no legally sufficient 
manner for the court to close the “evidential gap” on causation.36 
VIII. The limits of scientific evidence in the courtroom – Policy 
implications of Amaca 
32 By reaffirming the enduring vigour of “but for” causation in 
complex medical cases, the judgment in Amaca also served to clarify the 
nature of the legal as opposed to the scientific inquiry and how the two 
should perhaps intersect. In addressing the nature of the question, the 
High Court stated:37 
[D]espite this uncertainty [re the cause of Mr Cotton’s cancer], the 
courts must, and do, ‘reduce to legal certainty [a question] to which no 
other conclusive answer can be given’. The courts do that by asking 
whether it is more probable than not that X was a cause of Y. Saying 
only that exposure to asbestos may have been a cause of Mr Cotton’s 
cancer is not a sufficient basis for attributing legal responsibility. 
Observing that a small percentage of cases of cancer were probably 
caused by exposure to asbestos does not identify whether an 
individual is one of that group. And given the small size of the 
percentage, the observation does not, without more, support the 
drawing of an inference in a particular case. The paradox, if there be 
one, arises from the limits of knowledge about what causes cancer. 
33 The court’s reasoning aptly highlights the differences between 
the scientific and the legal inquiry and the approach to uncertainty in 
each. Science seeks a better understanding over time, whereas courts 
must make a judgment in the immediate. The many and varied risks of 
modern industrial society will prompt the courts to take recourse to 
science in clarifying their understanding of a given issue. Established 
medical facts, such as that the inhaling of silica dust can cause 
pneumoconiosis or that the inhaling of asbestos can cause 
mesothelioma, a disease far more highly correlated to exposure to 
asbestos than is lung cancer, can assist the courts in drawing certain 
                                                                       
36 As to the origin of the phrase “evidential gap” in this context, see Basil C Bitas, 
“Probability in the Courtroom” in Handbook of Probability: Theory and 
Applications (Tamás Rudas gen ed) (Sage Publications, 1st Ed, 2008) at p 429. See 
also Wayne Roth-Nelson & Kathey Verdeal, “Risk Evidence in Toxic Torts” (1995–6) 
2 Envtl Law 405 at 425–426. It is noteworthy that the High Court’s approach 
appears to reflect some of the views expressed by David Hamer in “Mind the 
Evidential Gap: Causation and Proof in Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis” [2009] 31 Syd L 
Rev 465, commenting on certain aspects of the lower courts’ approach to Amaca 
prior to the High Court decision; see especially pp 474 (discussing the 
“displacement” of the “but for” test in causation) and 475 (discussing the “scope of 
liability”). Some foundational evidence of causation regarding exposure to the 
agent in question appears necessary before the material contribution standard can 
be applied. 
37 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5 at [70]. 
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conclusions about causation and, yes, material contribution where 
multiple exposures to the same pathogen are at issue. Indirect proof in 
the form of epidemiology, if parsed and evaluated for what it can and 
cannot demonstrate, is also a valid source of reference. However, there 
are limits to what the scientific inquiry can contribute, or the extent to 
which it can substitute for the certainty that the legal inquiry requires. 
34 By refusing to extend Bonnington Castings38 and, conversely, by 
reaffirming the importance of the “but for” test in cases involving the 
medical and legal causation of complex multifactorial diseases, the court 
reaffirmed that while science has a role to play in settling legal questions, 
it cannot supersede the essential nature of the legal inquiry. Specifically, 
where the state of scientific knowledge promotes general understanding 
within a sea of uncertainty, this without more will not allow the specific 
plaintiff to satisfy his or her specific burden. There may be situations 
where this circumstance will result in difficult judgments for plaintiffs. 
However, the alternative in which a valid, but general scientific and 
statistical understanding regarding the association between certain low-
level risk factors and various pathologies is used to reduce evidentiary 
burdens and open the way to recovery, appears hardly desirable. 
35 While Amaca39 dealt with asbestos and cigarette smoking, the 
High Court’s cautious approach to the role and interpretation of 
scientific evidence and restraint in extending Bonnington Castings40 
reflect a reaffirmation of common law doctrine with an eye perhaps to 
curbing litigation in other evolving sectors, such as cell phones and 
power generation and transmission, which lie on the periphery of 
scientific understanding regarding risk and in which low-risk 
epidemiology is likely to be used to “demonstrate” causation in the onset 
of certain multifactorial pathologies. Life is full of risk, both real and 
imagined. By applying the “but for” test forthrightly and without 
equivocation, the court in Amaca appears to be stating that we must 
have some legitimate basis that the evidence is “real”, meaning legally 
foundational from the standpoint of causation, before we can begin to 
imagine. 
IX. Conclusion 
36 The court’s decision therefore signals a more cautious, read 
traditional, approach to causation in cases involving statistical evidence. 
Weighing the rights and interests of business, consumers, workers and 
                                                                       
38 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
39 Amaca Ltd v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
40 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
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the public at large, the court’s refusal to extend Bonnington Castings41 
marks a reaffirmation that scientific complexity should not be used to 
reduce the plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden. There must be evidence of 
causation in terms of biological fact, conclusive expert opinion, 
plausible statistical inference or some combination thereof before any 
discussion of “material contribution” can come into play. Moreover, any 
scientific evidence of a general nature adduced in court must be 
demonstrated as being relevant to the plaintiff ’s specific circumstances 
to fulfil the criterion of specific causation. 
37 The High Court’s careful approach to the scientific evidence, 
questioning what constitutes medical fact, limiting the basis on which a 
causal inference can be drawn, and reaffirming the “but for” standard 
for determining causation even, or particularly, in cases involving 
multiple risk factors of varying severity sets out a useful guidepost for 
litigants that is likely to resonate beyond the asbestos field. Claims of 
synergy and causal inferences drawn from statistical evidence must still 
be subjected to legal scrutiny carried out through a distinctly legal lens. 
The High Court fulfilled its role with care and legal sensitivity, thereby 
establishing a road map for common law courts in Australia and 
perhaps elsewhere regarding the appropriate manner of integrating 
scientific proof into the courtroom while protecting the integrity of the 
legal inquiry. 
 
                                                                       
41 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 1 AC 613. 
